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Locational Determinants of US Foreign Direct Investment in Food and Kindred Products
in Latin America
Introduction
       Long-term economic forecasts of world food demand suggest that much of the growth in
sales will be in foreign countries. Consequently, more US agribusinesses are attempting to
increase sales by expanding their activities abroad. Although exports are traditionally considered
to be the primary way to access overseas markets, US food companies earn far more from sales
of their foreign affiliates (Malanoski, 1994). In fact, in 1996 processed food sales by such firms
reached $121 billion, an amount 4.39 times larger than U.S. processed food exports of  $27.57
billion. This indicates that US firms reach foreign customers primarily through foreign direct
investment
1 (FDI) (Bolling, Neff and Handy, 1998).
       The international involvement of US agribusiness by way of FDI is large and growing
rapidly. According to the BEA, from 1982 to 1997, the US FDI position in food and kindred
products rose from $7.60 billion to $38.38 billion. Because of demographics, rapid economic
growth and geographical proximity, Latin American is an important destination for much of this
investment. Therefore, the growth of FDI flows into Latin America during the last decade is
certain to generate new discussion as to how hemispheric production locations and patterns of
trade could be affected. Despite the importance of US FDI activities, there are relatively few
studies that specifically address US FDI in food and kindred products and fewer studies that
focus on Latin American countries. Accordingly, both policymakers and agribusiness managers
need to know what factors drive investment in this region. A better understanding of the factors
will allow for better policy decisions in the future.
                                                       
1 Investment whose aim is to exercise managerial control over a foreign enterprise.2
       With that in mind, the objective of this research is to determine the factors that are
associated with US FDI in food and kindred products. Specifically, this research focuses on
location specific determinants of US FDI in food and kindred products in the five largest Latin
American economies.
       This paper begins with an explanation of the broad conditions under which FDI takes place
and introduces the framework for the creation of an empirical model of US FDI in food and
kindred products in Latin America. The second section describes the method required to estimate
the model and variable definitions. The third section identifies data sources and the last section
presents conclusions and implications derived from empirical model results.
Determinants of FDI
       Because FDI is a complex endeavor there are many theories seeking to explain it. In an
attempt to organize the competing paradigms of neoclassical, behavioral and institutional
theories of FDI developed by Hymer (1976), Vernon (1966), Buckley and Casson (1976), Caves
(1971) and others, Dunning developed an eclectic approach. According to the eclectic paradigm,
three conditions must exist in order for FDI to take place. The first is the presence of firm
specific ownership advantages, the second is the existence of benefits from internalizing
economic activity and the third is the existence of location specific advantages. Ownership
advantages are firm specific qualities (e.g. proprietary technology and superior management
skills) needed to overcome the disadvantage of operating in an unfamiliar environment.
Internalization advantages are those that accrue from minimizing transaction costs or buyer
uncertainty by exchanging intermediate inputs within branches of the firm rather than with
others. Location specific advantages are factors external to the firm such as natural or created
host country endowment, investment incentives or disincentives, provided infrastructure and the3
economic system (Dunning, 1977). Viewed as a multi-stage decision making process, firms
consider ownership and internalization advantages to determine whether to invest and evaluate
location advantages to decide where to invest. Of the three determinants, location-specific factors
are the most likely to be influenced by government (UNCTAD, 1998).
Empirical Model of Location Specific Determinants of FDI
       A large body of empirical research investigates location specific determinants of FDI.
Econometric analyses utilizing time-series data typically test the hypotheses that market size;
market growth; exchange rates; trade impediments and capital controls influence the level of FDI
(UNCTC, 1991).
       The market size hypothesis suggests that a host economy must be of a sufficient size to
allow local operations to achieve economies of scale. Numerous research have found that the
size of the internal market (GNP or GDP) is the most significant determinant of FDI (Lunn;
Scaperlanda and Barlough; Torrisi; UNCTAD (1998)). Ning (1993) confirms that GDP has a
significant positive relationship for US FDI in food and kindred products.
       The market growth hypothesis suggests that the growth rate of a host economy is an
indicator of market potential. This has been tested in several studies and the evidence is mixed.
Lunn (1980) for instance, finds the GDP growth rate in the most recent year to be significantly
positively related to US FDI in the EEC, but lagged one year, is significantly negatively related.
       The exchange rate hypothesis suggests that changes in relative exchange rate levels between
countries influence FDI (Aliber, 1971; Cushman, 1985; Froot and Stein 1991). The rationale is
that the value of the US dollar relative to a foreign currency affects the cost of acquiring and
operating foreign assets, thereby making FDI a more or less attractive option. Within the context
of real exchange risk and expectations Cushman (1985) argues that the exchange rate may have a4
positive or negative influence on FDI depending on the cost/revenue structure of the investing
firm. Froot and Stein (1991) focus on capital market imperfections (e.g. information
asymmetries). Capital market imperfections, they maintain, may give rise to cost of capital
disparities between countries and these disparities may in turn, give less credit constrained
foreign investors the ability to outbid local rivals for the purchase of an asset. In a similar vein,
Krugman (1998) argues that the dramatic depreciation of some Asian currencies lowered the
value of local assets and hence, the ability of local firms to borrow and outbid foreign rivals.
McCorriston and Sheldon (1998) tested the relationship between real exchange rates and relative
share prices on FDI in the US food industry and surprisingly, found that neither variable offered
explanatory power. This they attribute to industry specific factor or data inadequacy. The effect
of tax rates has also been analyzed and generally been found to discourage FDI. Nevertheless,
long-term investors may focus on the characteristics of the entire host country tax system rather
than on particular tax incentives or disincentives (UNCTAD, 1998). This does not mean tax rates
are irrelevant. Indeed, given comparable investment conditions, a tie between two locations may
be broken by fiscal considerations. Other studies have also incorporated trade impediments into
consideration as politically derived aspect of host country economic policies.
       The trade impediment hypothesis suggests that trade policy may influence FDI in competing
ways. On the one hand, import restraints would tend to promote import-substituting FDI while
trade liberalization would tend to discourage it and instead, create incentives for market and/or
efficiency seeking FDI. Therefore, in the context of regional integration, the impact of trade
liberalization on FDI depends on the balancing out of these competing effects (Blomström and
Kokko, 1997). From this perspective, Scaperlanda and Barlough (1983) test the hypothesis that
US subsidiaries in Europe would increase FDI in anticipation of the single market and find that5
the progressive lowering of tariffs within the EEC exerts a positive influence on US FDI. The
next section presents the methodology and variables used on the empirical model of FDI.
Methodology and Variable Definition
       This empirical model seeks to explain the U.S. FDI position abroad in food and kindred
product as a function of variables intended to capture the market size, market growth, and
exchange rate hypotheses as well as the effect of taxes. These variables were chosen according to
data availability and suitability for hypothesis testing. GDP and GDP growth, rather than
projected total sales or sales growth, are included as broader measures intended to test the market
size and market growth hypotheses; both should be positively related to FDI. In the absence of
real exchange rate data, the nominal exchange rate between the host country and the US is used
to test the hypothesis that currency values influence FDI. Including a tax variable tests the
hypothesis that host country fiscal policies affect FDI.  To test the trade impediment hypothesis,
a measure of “trade openness” was used instead of tariff levels as it better captures the outward
orientation of a host economy. The functional forms are assumed to be linear and the exact
specification is written:
Where i = Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela.
        POSi = the variable measuring FDI;
        GDPi = the host country gross domestic product in US dollars;
        GRWi = the year to year gross domestic product growth in the host country.
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        TAXi = foreign income tax rate (foreign income tax paid by USMC’S divided by their sales
in the host country).
        TRDi = Merchandise import plus merchandise exports divided by GDP (is the ratio of trade
to GDP, which signifies trade openness).
       For each country, the FDI model includes one-period lagged FDI values. This geometric lag
specification accounts for potential adjustment cost, as investment is inherently costly and habit
persistence, as well as institutional, technological and psychological inertia, impede the
instantaneous attainment of ideal capital stocks levels. Consequently, each attempt is only partly
successful during a given period, thereby creating dynamic demand (Kmenta, 1986). This
situation describes a partial-adjustment model where the desired, rather than the actual value of
the dependent variable is determined by the independent variables (Kennedy, 1979). This
adjustment cost, or equivalently, partial adjustment hypothesis, is tested with a simple t-test of
the lagged dependent variable coefficient.
Data Sources
       The data used for this study are pooled across five countries over a period of fourteen years
(a total of 70 observations). These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and
Venezuela and the time series data covers the years 1982 to 1995. The foreign direct investment
position data came from the BEA’s US Direct Investment Abroad: Balance of Payments &
Direct Investment Position Estimates 1982-1996, diskette (BE-50), 1997 edition. The GDP, GDP
growth and trade openness data was obtained from the World Bank, World Development
Indicators CD-ROM, 1997 edition. Exchange rates were obtained from the IMF International
Financial Statistics CD-ROM, 1997. Tax rates were calculated by dividing MNEs foreign
income tax paid divided by total sales in the host country. This data was obtained from the U.S.7
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  With this data, econometric estimates of the FDI model
are obtained with a GLS/SUR procedure that pools the time-series and cross sectional data,
maintaining fixed country effects.
Results
       The null hypothesis that the system variance-covariance matrix is diagonal was rejected but
further tests revealed the presence of heteroscedasticity. Therefore, a generalized least squares
heteroscedasticity correction method was applied to produce unbiased estimates of all model
parameters (Breusch-Pagan, 1980). The results obtained show that the direct investment position
equation has a high level of explanatory power, exhibiting R2 .9678 for the entire system. Table
1 presents model results and shows that the POSt-1 variable has a positive and significant effect
on US FDI in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. Short-run elasticities show that responsiveness
is highest in Mexico followed by Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia. In more than one
period the speed of adjustment of the FDI position follows the same order. That Mexico adjusts
fastest may be because U.S. investors could be better acquainted with Mexican business
conditions due to geographical proximity and closer communication.
       The parameter estimates here also support previous studies maintaining that GDP is the most
influential location determinant of FDI. In this case, GDP (in U.S. dollars) has a positive and
significant effect in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela at a greater than 5% significance level.
Surprisingly, the results for the GDP growth rate hypothesis are idiosyncratic as they vary by
country. In this case the GDP growth rate (GRW) has a negative effect in Argentina and
Venezuela and a positive effect in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. The negative sign and lack of
significance is unexpected because GRW represents a market’s underlying growth and thus, it8
influences expectations of future GDP levels. A likely explanation is that because FDI is a long-
term commitment, it is influenced by long run trends rather than by year to year GDP changes.
       In this analysis, the signs for the exchange rate variable are positive in Argentina, Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela but significant and negative in Brazil. Therefore, for the majority of the
countries studied, depreciation of the domestic currency in relation to the dollar has a positive
influence on FDI. A plausible explanation is that during the time period involved, rigid currency
stabilization programs applied by some of the countries in the study often led to currency
overvaluation. An overvalued currency may discourage FDI since it raises investment cost and
increases the risk of sudden exchange rate adjustment. The reverse effect in Brazil may be
explained because the local currency depreciated at an almost exponential rate and the Cruzado
stabilization plan was a dismal failure due to rampant inflation resulting from fiscal and credit
profligacy.
       In the case of the tax variable, the results show positive and negative effects across countries
suggesting that the effect is country specific. The tax variable has a positive effect in Argentina
and Venezuela and a negative effect in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Tax increases in Brazil
may have been viewed negatively by investors because fiscal policies at the time encouraged
inflation rather than infrastructure investment. In the case of Mexico and Colombia, the negative
result may be due because the use of tax revenue to restore a fiscal balance may have reduced the
amount of public funds available for public investment. In the case of Argentina tax increases
may have been positively viewed by investors as they were part a credible plan of fiscal austerity
and tax financed public investment. In the case of Venezuela, the same effect may be due to
foreign investors welcoming successive rounds of liberalization of FDI regulations. In general
terms, these results suggest that FDI may be discouraged by taxes as they have a direct impact on9
profitability. However, tax increases may have a positive influence if they sign toward potential
benefits such as infrastructure investment.
       Finally, a test of the trade impediment theory yields interesting results. In this case, “trade
openness” has as a positive effect in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, while it has a negative
effect in Mexico and Venezuela. As expected, trade openness exhibits a competing effect on
FDI. One is complementary to FDI and the other is a substitute. Trade openness may be
complementary as domestic buyers learn of foreign goods and their value but may also be a
substitute as it may displace investment intended to avoid trade restrictions. This study shows
that in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, trade openness has a positive effect on FDI. This
corresponds with the notion that the expectation of a trade union is likely to make a region more
attractive for investment. However, for Mexico and Venezuela, trade openness was a negative
influence on FDI. This may be because relative strong domestic currencies during part of the
1982-1995 time period and proximity to the US may have biased these economies toward
imports rather than FDI to serve domestic and export markets. This effect is expected to dissipate
after the effects Mexican devaluation of 1994 run their course and once NAFTA and the Andean
Pact are well underway. Taking into consideration the estimating model results, conclusions and
implications follow.
Conclusions and Implications
       Based on these results, the main conclusion of this study is that market size is the dominant
influence on US FDI in food and kindred product in Latin America. Hence, the presence of large
prosperous economies allowing the achievement of economies of scale needed to operate in
domestic or regional markets may be the principal driver of FDI into Latin America. This is10
especially the case for food industries where bulky, perishable products and localized taste
require firms to be in close proximity to the end consumer.
       Further, that direct investment responds slowly to short-term economic conditions indicates
that the growing international specialization and division of activities through FDI is a long-term,
and by no means an automatic, process. It is characterized by rigidities and inertia created by
physical, psychological and legal considerations that raises the cost of spatially rearranging
productive activities. Positive elasticities for all countries suggests that macroeconomic structural
adjustment policies implemented throughout the region may have created an economic
environment that attracts U.S. FDI in food and kindred products.
       In regard to the effect of nominal exchange rates on FDI, the depreciation of the local
currency in relation to the dollar was shown to be a generally positive influence. However, the
result for Brazil suggests that the economic environment under which extreme currency
depreciation takes place also influence FDI. Model results also indicate that FDI is negatively
influenced by taxes as they reduce profitability but that may not necessarily be the case if
investors are also taking into account potential future benefits. In regards to trade openness, a
reasonable generalization is that in the absence of gross macro-economic distortions (principally
dealing with exchange rates), regional integration, especially in MERCOSUR may attract US
FDI in food and kindred products
       In conclusion, the interaction and linkages between companies, states and societies suggests
that FDI is a dynamic process where the basis for choosing a given location may be determined
by differences in factor endowment, technology and productivity levels between individual
nations. This international specialization and division of activities, allows multinational
corporations to access country specific resources and in turn, it allows nations to gain access to11
multinational corporation resources (and its spillover effects). Since MNEs can shift resources at
will, the implication is that there are certain initiatives that individual companies and the U.S.
and individual Latin American governments can engage in that strengthen the relationship
between ownership and location advantages.
       These initiatives include the fostering of a stable macroeconomic environment that allows
firms, governments and the public in general to conduct long-term projects. Private and public
investment in infrastructure, education, training, health and the fulfillment of the basic needs of
the poorest sectors of the population are also some ways in which governments and firms can
work together to increase productivity and facilitate the structural adjustment process. The
strengthening of public institutions (e.g. law enforcement, regulatory agencies) that help market
based economies to operate more efficiently complement this initiatives.
       In short, the aim of these proposals is to foster an environment that makes a host-economy
more responsive and its people more able to take advantage of the dynamic economic
opportunities created by the globalization of production activities. Or in other words, to attract
and harness the benefits derived from FDI to create, retain and upgrade local industries.
       While some these issues may on the surface appear to be subsidiary to traditional location
determinants, once major barriers to FDI are removed, secondary considerations may gain
importance in investor’s decisions. Therefore, further research is needed to test whether a
different class of country specific factors such as social stability, the structure of markets, the
presence of business services, investment promotion, administrative efficiency and social
amenities influence US FDI in food and kindred products in Latin America.12
Table 1  Results of Latin American SUR Model of U.S. FDI in Food and Kindred
               Products:1982-1995
Dependent Variable Explanatory Variable
U.S. FDI Investment Position POSt-1 GDP GRW EX TAX TRD
Argentina Coefficient 0.477* 165.3 -480.37 39.68 3751.8* 1010.5
t-ratio 3.487 1.771 -1.458 0.382 2.145 1.243
Short-run [0.055] [0.087] [-0.003] [0.006] [0.022] [0.044]
Long-run [0.106] [0.167] [-0.005] [0.011] [0.042] [0.086]
Brazil Coefficient 0.246 325.55* 406.10 -206.66 -6354.9* 4731.60
t-ratio 1.533 2.810 0.402 -0.504 -1.981 1.461
Short-run [0.076] [0.411] [0.003] [-0.010] [-0.089] [0.245]
Long-run [0.100] [0.545] [0.004] [-0.013] [-0.117] [0.325]
Colombia Coefficient 0.080 235.77 381.48 0.031 -99.51 154.52
t-ratio 0.396 1.794 0.654 0.313 -0.887 0.269
Short-run [0.004] [0.036] [0.005] [0.005] [-0.002] [0.014]
Long-run [0.019] [0.177] [0.025] [0.024 [-0.007] [0.068]
Mexico Coefficient 0.659* 468.51* 1041.70 88.87 -15701* -1800.10
t-ratio 5.300 4.136 0.777 0.927 -2.191 -1.032
Short-run [0.194] [0.365] [0.003] [0.074] [-0.187] [-0.195]
Long-run [0.567] [1.070] [0.009] [0.216] [-0.547] [-0.571]
Venezuela Coefficient 0.413* 646.54* -190.52 0.825* 2818.4* -268.26
t-ratio 1.960 4.010 -1.608 2.219 2.535 -0.792
Short-run [0.026] [0.134] [-0.001] [0.017] [0.034] [-0.037]
Long-run [0.045] [0.228] [-0.002] [0.030] [0.057] [-0.064]
Numbers in brackets [ ] are elasticities
A single asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level
POSt-1= The Lagged U.S foreign direct investment position in food and kindred products
GDP= The host country gross domestic product
GRW= The year to year gross domestic product growth rate in the host country
EX= The exchange rate, defined as the ratio of host country currency to the US dollar
TAX= Foreign income tax paid divided by foreign sales
TRD= Merchandise imports + merchandise exports divided by GDP13
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